## 1NC

### Off

**We’ll begin with a story from Meinzerin, Kuhn, and Klausmann in 1997**

(Marion Meinzerin, professor of history at Cambridge University, Gabriel Kuhn, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck, Ulrike Klausman, freelance journalist, “Woman Pirates and the politics of the Jolly Roger”, Pg 18-22, *azp*)

**Medusa is the Gorgon’s head threatening to emerge from the sea. This terrible monster was once a beautiful woman who was raped in a temple of Athena by the sea god Poseidon.** According to Ovid, **Athena was so enraged that she turned Medusa into an ugly creature, transforming her hair into a thousand snakes**. After that **Medusa was so ugly that any man who caught sight of her would turn to stone**. Very much in keeping with modern»day court procedures in cases of rape, **Athena let the rapist go unpunished**. Why was **Athena** so hostile to women? Actually she **was a very ancient wise goddess, of far older origin than the male Hellenic gods.** But **after the arrival of male gods to the mythology, she was transformed into a being birthed from Zeus’s** head, who had swallowed her mother Metis, the Goddess of Wisdom, who was pregnant with Athena by parthenogenesis. Afterwards, **Athena became the protective goddess of many a hero. One of them was Perseus the Destroyer. He was sent to kill Medusa. Athena gave him a perfectly reﬂective bronze shield, so that he could see Medusa without looking at her**. Thanks to this device, **Perseus was able to behead Medusa, with Athena guiding his hand. He stuck Medusa’s head in a sack and gave it as a gift to Athena, who thereafter carried the snakes on her breastplate so as to strike fear into her enemies**. The symbol of the snake always belonged to Athena, whose mother Metis was called “the wise counsel.” In prehistoric times the snake was a symbol of feminine wisdom, and not just of growth and fertility, as was later assumed. Metis and Medusa represent one and the same power. The name Medusa, a feminine form of medon (ruler), derives from the Sanskrit root medha (wisdom), which is also the root for the Greek metis (good counsel). **The grimace of the grey-skinned snake’s head expresses the fury of those women who still remember**. The Latin word for causing someone to think of something, to remind or to warn, is monere. Etymologically a “monster” is thus the “emblem of the gods in terrifying manifestation.” The monster Medusa reﬂects countless obsessive ideas about sea monsters. In mythological terms, **the Medusa story relates the destruction of female culture**; in psychoanalytic terms it describes the hero’s murder of his mother, and femininity as a psycho-symbolic monstrosity? In the end **Perseus failed to achieve his goal, despite divine** protection and all manner of magical assistance, and although he killed his enemy in her sleep with his hand guided by Athena. **Medusa lives on, the Gorgon’s head has grown back, and its fury has by no means burnt out**. The terror of men before Gorgo, who pulls ships into the depths by their bowsprit in the midst of a tempest, is fully justiﬁed. **Gorgo is the Greek name not only for Medusa—petriﬁed through “ugliness”—but also for the mermaids, who are known to be beautiful and lovely. This may seem like a paradox, but corresponds to the ambivalence with which men view the female**. Aristotle’s hostility to women is far more consistent, and serves to clarify the connection. The relationship between femininity, ﬁsh, mermaids, and sea monsters lies in the attributes “wet” and “cold.” These beings all have a shortage of “heat,” and are thus also lacking in soul and reason. According to Aristotle, a mother only provides the passive material, while the father contributes the active soul endowed with reason. He bears the true species of humans (man). If a mother nonetheless brings a female being to the world, she has circumvented the reasoning species, and once again set loose upon the world a monster lacking in soul. In the legends of seafarers, mermaids also have no souls—but might be able to occasionally acquire one by adopting a respectable way of life among people, and falling in love with a man. Patriarchal **stories of dragon-slaying show two different images of the female: the powerful, threatening mother in the form of the monster, and the desirable, submissive virgin**. In the killing of the dragon, psychoanalysts like C.G. lung and Erich Neumann saw the liberation of **the man from his terrible mother, and the conquest of a new image of the female in the form of the lovely virgin. The man becomes a hero by freeing the virgin from the claws of the mighty monster, in order to subordinate her to himself**. In his book on the origins of consciousness, Erich Neumann writes: “the transformation of the male that occurs in the course of battling the dragon includes a change in his relationship to the female, symbolised in the liberation of the hostage from the power of the dragon; meaning a dissolution of the image of the female from that of the terrible mother.“ Neumann ignores that in antiquity, the life-giving femininity of the Earth and the cosmos was worshipped in the form of the Great Mother. In all her monstrosity she threatens the male need for recognition. That which psychologists understand as the liberation of man from the overwhelming power of mother is actually a desire in the collective male consciousness to subdue nature itself. **The story of** our hero **Perseus goes on to show how pointless these acts of violence actually are. Flying high on the trip home after his “glorious” beheading of Medusa, Perseus encounters a beautiful, naked virgin chained to a cliff. On the horizon a sea monster approaches**. The unhappy girl is the daughter of an Ethiopian queen, who had boasted that she and her daughter were as beautiful as the Nereids. The Nereids promptly lodged a complaint with Poseidon, who sent out a ﬂood of storms and a female sea monster in retribution. An oracle declared that the queen’s daughter had to be chained to the cliffs. **Perseus, a man of action, did not dilly-dally**. After quickly negotiating the dowry with the parents of the princess, **he killed the monster in a bloody battle, and “as prize and cause of all the trouble the virgin strides up, released from her chains**,” according to Ovid. Here **Perseus seems to have won the battle of his life, acquiring a kingdom and a lovely princess.** But closer observation shows that the action has gone subtly awry. **The lovely and passive princess is called Andromeda**: andro-mcda, meaning **the “ruler of men.” The information that her mother is an Ethiopian suggests a likely relationship to the Libyan Medusa**. **Apparently the beautiful virgin and her monstrous mother relate one and the same femininity**. Leviathan poses the biblical counterpart to the Greek myth of Medusa. He is a sea serpent, appearing in the legends of sea travellers as the worst of all sea monsters, crushing ships and swallowing seafarers.

**The affirmative’s view of the Other is that of Perseus’s perception of women – the Other is dangerous yet alluring – something to be mapped yet radically unknowable – something to be defeated yet something to be won – a role of the ballot calling for the liberation of the oppressed is symptomatic of the masculine heroism Perseus is engrained in – the ballot becomes a symbol of the prize of Otherness while ontologically erasing the subaltern – the affirmative’s distancing of themselves from those they invoke is like Perseus’s shield – they view the subaltern through a kaleidoscopic lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditioned simulacra we call the debate round – this knowledge production is not just useless neutrality but rather the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject – any argument the affirmative makes about how the subaltern would totally be on-board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior Other – a ballot for the affirmative is giving the subaltern a cordectomy**

**Spivak 88** (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* 1988“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, *azp*)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

**Isn’t it off-putting that the affirmative merely expresses solidarity with the oppressed yet does little to nothing to actually relieve their oppression? – What do you think their endless theories, intellectual movements, and speech acts actually DO to resolve anything? – the answer is absolutely nothing – they aren’t subversive, nor radical, nor even that interesting – their speech act is an intellectual façade designed to avoid having to resolve oppression**

**Raskin 99** (Marcus Raskin, Professor of Public Policy at George Washington University, 1999, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

As I have noted, world social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change. For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are permitted their doubts, however. After all, what can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? **What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members?** Why should the oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [\*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and financial terror around the world. So even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted your words of understanding, but **now what?** How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, **it was a betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom**. **Education and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at the beginning of the twentieth century**. For some, the god that really failed them was education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.

It is a form of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to found solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing suffering portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

**The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust**

**Chow 93** (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

**This knowledge production is merely an attempt to map out the coordinates of alterity for the targeting computers of our death machines**

**Chow, 6** (Rey Chow, Humanities and Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, 2006 The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, 40-1)

Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/”eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

**The alternative is the judge should vote negative to engage in academic exile – rather than examining structures external to this round, we should question our privilege to speak in the first place – our rejection of the academy is a precondition for any semblance of solvency**

**Biswas 07** (Shampa BISWAS, Politics @ Whitman, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium 36)

Said has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he has also articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’ which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. Exile, he says, ‘is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes even more urgent in the contemporary context in which the hyperpatriotic surge following the events of 11 September 2001 has made considerable inroads into the US academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for the renewal of the nation-state project is troubling in itself; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

### Off

**Against the affirmative’s paralyzing discursive politics, it is more important than ever to emphasize Marx’s insight that transformations in consciousness can never lead to social transformations – only struggling to transform the real material conditions that structure social relations can bring about social change**

**Marx, 1845**

(Karl, The German Ideology, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm>)

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the **material production** of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e. civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc. etc. and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly on the real ground of history; **it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice;** and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that **all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism**, by resolution into “self-consciousness” or transformation into “apparitions,” “spectres,” “fancies,” etc. but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory. It shows that history does not end by being resolved into “self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit,” but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.

**Unfortunately, Marx’s insight has been all but discarded by the new left, with its emphasis on being postmodern, postcolonial, poststructural, postMarxist, or post-anything. This post-al politics of the contemporary left focuses on discourse and language at the expense of analyzing real material conditions. This post-al logic is complicit with capitalism, especially insofar as it obscures the operation of political economy and the material reality of capitalism**

**Zavarzadeh, 94** – Dept English @ Syracuse (Mas’ud, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production”, The Alternative Orange, V 4, Fall/Winter 1994, http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/4/v4n1\_cpp.html)

The task of this text[1] is to lay bare the structure of assumptions and its relation to the workings of the regime of capital and wage-labor (what I have articulated as “post-al logic"),[2] that unites all these seemingly different texts as they recirculate some of the most reactionary practices that are now masquerading as “progressive” in the postmodern academy. Analyzing the post-al logic of the left is important because it not only **reveals how the ludic left is complicit with capitalism** but, for the more immediate purposes of this text-of-response, it allows us to relate the local discussions in these texts to global problems and to deal, in OR‐2's words, with the “encompassing philosophical issues”[3] that are so violently suppressed by the diversionist uses of “detailism”[4] in these nine texts. Whether they regard themselves to be “new new left," “feminist," “neo-Marxist," or “anarchist," these texts—in slightly different local idioms—do the ideological work of US capitalism by producing theories, pedagogies, arguments, ironies, anecdotes, turns of phrases and jokes that **obscure the laws of motion of capital.** Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of “production” as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on “consumption” and “distribution” as the driving force of the social. The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that “labor," in advanced industrial “democracies," is superseded by “information," and consequently “knowledge” (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the “metaphysics of labor” and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the “outdatedness” of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy—which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler and others have advised)—should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) “mall"—the ultimate site of consumption “with all the latest high-tech textwares” deployed to pleasure the “body." In fact, the post-al left has “invented” a whole new interdiscipline called “cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from “production” to “consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its “progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, [Henry /Robert] Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how “consumption” is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from “production” to “consumption” manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on “superstructural” cultural analysis and **the preoccupation not with the “political economy**” ("base") **but with “representation**"—for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality and identity. This is, for example, one reason for R-2's ridiculing the “base” and “superstructure” analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of “argument” for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that “basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for him/her is to be thrown into an “epistemological gulag”. For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as R-4 puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the “surplus value” is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which “surplus value"—the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor—is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished, rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy, in these texts, therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to “politicizing the classroom” in OR‐1) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned into—through the process that OR‐3 calls “translation"—into “consumable” EXPERIENCES. The more “intense” the experience, as the anecdotes of OR‐3 show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic obscures the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves—many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my “Post-ality” in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that “democracy” is a never-ending, open "dialogue” and “conversation” among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is “power”; that a post-class hegemonic “coalition," as OR‐5 calls it—and not class struggle—is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-2 writes) is an “epistemological gulag"—a construct of power—and thus any form of “ideology critique” that raises questions of “falsehood” and “truth” ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the “other” truths by, in OR‐5 words, “staking sole legitimate claim” to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of “epistemology” is displaced in the ludic academy by “rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the “truth” of a practice but whether it “works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, R-4 is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the “truth” of my texts) end up “cutting our funding?" he/she asks. A post-al leftist like R-4, in short, “resists” the state only in so far as the state does not cut his/her “funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like OR‐5 to conclude that my argument “has little prospect of effectual force” in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of “epistemology” and the erasure of the question of “truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the “truth question” is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism (R-2), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the “difference” of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as R-2 sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of “epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables R-4 to answer my question, “What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is “wrong” with dogmatism, she/he says is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of his/her text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.[5]

Capitalism exacerbates structural violence

Brown 5(Charles Brown, Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan; “Capitalism, Exploitation, and Oppression,” 5/13/2005, http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.html)

The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or **exacerbates all major social ills of our times**. With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. **The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity,** grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to spiral, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most workers experience long years of **stagnant real wages,** while health and education costs **soar**. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. **Racist violence** and the poison of racist ideas **victimize** all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and **male supremacist ideology** perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.

**Reject their assertion that discourse and performance can change material social realities**

**We must return to Marx, recognizing that the only hope for human survival is a politics which engages in struggles to change material social relations rather than discursive attempts to change assumptions—any attempt to work within the system of capitalism is doomed to failure—our alternative is the only hope for human survival**

Harman, 7 – Editor of the Socialst Worker, 97 (Chris, Economics of the madhouse, Pg 99-100)

‘A reprise in the early 21st century of the conditions in the early part of this century. Such is the danger that confronts the world if we cannot deal with the present crisis concludes Will Hutton in his book The State We’re In. Those conditions included two world wars, the rise of Nazism, the collapse o democracy across most of Europe, the victory of Stalinism, the death camps and the gulag. If they were to be repeated in a few years time there is no doubt it would be on a much more horrific scale that even Hitler could not imagine. We would indeed be facing a future of barbarism, if not the destruction of the whole of humanity. Warnings of such a future are not to be treated lightly. Already the crisis of the 1990’s has begun to unleash the same barbaric forces we saw in the 1930’s. In one country after another political adventurers who support the existing system are making careers for themselves by trying to scapegoat ethnic or religious minorities. In the Russia, the Hitler admirer, racist, and proponent of nuclear war, Zhirinovsky got 24 percent of the vote in the November 1993 poll. In Bombay, another Hitler admirer, Bal Thackercey, runs the state government, threatening to wage war against the Muslim minority. In turkey the government and the military wage a war against the Kurdish fifth of the population, while the fascists try to incite Sunni Muslims to murder Alawi Muslims. In Rwanda the former dictator unleashed a horrific slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus, while in neighboring Burundi there is the threat of slaughter of Hutus by Tutsis. All this horror has its origins in the failure of market capitalism to provide even minimally satisfactory lives for the mass of people. Instead is leaves a fifth of the worlds’ population under nourished and most of the rest doubting whether they will be able to enjoy tomorrow the small comforts that allowed to them today Both the out and out defenders of ruling class power and today’s timid cowed reformists tell us there is no alternative to this system. But if that is true then there is no hope for humanity. Politics becomes merely about having the deckchairs on the titanic while making sure no one disturbs the rich and privileged as they dine at the captain’s table. But there is an alternative. The whole crazy system of alienated labor is a product of what we do. Human beings have the power to seize control of the ways of creating wealth and to subordinate them to our decisions, to our values. We do not have to leave them to the blind caprice of the market to the mad rush of the rival owners of wealth in their race to keep ahead of each other. The new technologies that are available today, far from making out lives worse have the potential to make this control easier. Automated work processes could provide us with more leisure, with more time for creativity and more change to deliberate where the world is going. Computerism could provide us with the unparalleled information about the recourses available to satisfy our needs and how to deploy them effectivly But this alternative cannot come from working within the system, from accepting the insane logic of the market, of competitive accumulation, of working harder in order to force someone else to worker harder or lose their job. The alternative can only come from fighting against the system and the disastrous effect its logic has on the lives of the mass of people

## 2NC

### OV

**Their failure to recognize privilege as speaking subjects takes out any solvency and means there’s only a risk of a link.**

**Chow 93** (Rey Chow, professor of English and comparative literature and director of the comparative literature program at the University of California, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, p. 118-9)

For "third world" intellectuals, the lures of diaspora consist in this masked hegemony. As in the case of what I call masculinist positions in the China field, their resort to "minority discourse," including the discourse of class and gender struggles, veils their own fatherhood over the "ethnics" at home even while it continues to legitimize them as "ethnics" and "minorities" in the West. In their hands, minority discourse and class struggle, especially when they take the name of another nation, another culture, another sex, or another body, turn into signifiers whose major function is that of discursive exchange for the intellectuals' self-profit. Like "the people," "real people," "the populace," "the peasants," "the poor," "the homeless," and all such names, these signifiers work insofar as they gesture toward another place (the lack in discourse-construction) that is "authentic" but that cannot be admitted into the circuit of exchange. . What happens eventually is that this "third world" that is produced, circulated, and purchased by "third world" intellectuals in the cosmopolitan diasporic space will be exported "back home" in the form of values—intangible goods—in such a way as to obstruct the development of the native industry. To be sure, one can perhaps no longer even speak of a "native industry" as such in the multinational corporate postmodernity, but it remains for these intellectuals to face up to their truthful relation to those "objects of study" behind which they can easily hide— as voyeurs, as "fellow victims," and as self-appointed custodians. Hence the necessity to read and write against the lures of diaspora: Any attempt to deal with "women" or the "oppressed classes" in the "third world" that does not at the same time come to terms with the historical conditions of its own articulation is bound to \* repeat the exploitativeness that used to and still characterizes most "exchanges" between "West" and "East." Such attempts will also be expediently assimilated within the plenitude of the hegemonic establishment, with all the rewards that that entails. No one can do without some such rewards. What one can do without is the illusion that, through privileged speech, one is helping to save the wretched of the earth.

Your role as a judge is to interrogate how we should deal with our privileged positions which allow us to speak in the first place.  
Chow 1993

/Rey, Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, “Writing Diaspora” p 15-17 google books/

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

Situatedness shapes knowledge – the myth of a neutral subject is the foundation of epistemic colonialism

Grosfoguel 11 (Ramon Grosfoguel – PhD in sociology and associate professor in Ethnics studies and Chicano/Latino studies at UC Berkeley, 2011, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity,¶ Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf) //MD

The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist ¶ subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric ¶ paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the ¶ “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system” (Grosfoguel 2005; 2006b) for ¶ the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. ¶ Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Collins 1990) as ¶ well as Third World scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977) ¶ reminded us that we always speak from a particular location in the power structures. ¶ Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and ¶ racial hierarchies of the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system“. As ¶ feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. ¶ Black feminist scholars called this perspective “afro-centric epistemology” (Collins ¶ 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American ¶ Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it “geopolitics of knowledge” (Dussel ¶ 1977) and, following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldúa (1987), I will use the term “body-politics of knowledge.” This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the ¶ fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of ¶ enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that ¶ speaks. In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always ¶ hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis. The “ego-politics of knowledge” of ¶ Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated “Ego”. ¶ Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are ¶ always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from ¶ the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth ¶ about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the ¶ structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.

## 1NR

### AT: Perm

**They cannot stray from their 1ac performance – the choice to exclude certain discussions is not value neutral but a consequence of narrative framing – the 1ac is a static artifact and their attempt to escape that initial framing is in itself a form of violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne Kappeler, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, 1995, pg. 69-71)

The choice of formulation is political; it is an expression of one’s political attitude. Not only does it reveal how the subject con­stitutes itself — whom it chooses to address and to constitute as the ‘we’ of its discourse, and whom and what it chooses to make an object of speech. It also shows what the subject considers to be the ‘whole’ of the speech or action context and what it chooses to exclude from it. That is, it reveals the subject’s communicative intention. If we lock others into the status of ‘the others’, for example, it is a sign that we do not wish to enter into communication and dialogue with them. Allocating ‘them’ the status of the ‘other’, ‘we’ are speak­ing to ‘ourselves’. As androcentric discourse is speech from men to men and about women, and Eurocentric discourse is speech among Europeans at the ‘centre’ of the world and about those at the ‘pen­phery’, so a white—women—centric discourse is a white women s soliloquy, power speaking to itself. Its addressees are ‘white women —not other white women addressed as communicants in a dialogue, but ‘white women’ as the plural of the white woman subject — we as the plural of myself, talking about ‘them’. It also means that, while we acutely object to being objectified through men’s sexist discourse, considering it to be a form of violence, we do not apparently consider it an act of violence if we ourselves objectify other women — all the less so if those women are absent from the specific speech context. That is to say, we do not consider those we objectify and speak about to be a relevant part of the speech and action context, nor do we consider our act of objectifying them to have any consequences for them worth thinking about. A ‘kind’ interpretation of this discursive behaviour would see it as a result of patriarchal socialization — acquired from dominant discourse as we acquired our ‘mother tongue’ from the speech of our mothers, so that we have unconsciously internalized racism, sexism, classism and scientificness, which now trap and implicate us in our own speech. It is an explanation which, just as Alice Walker criticizes, starts from the assumption of women’s weakness and damagedness, appeal­ing for indulgence on account of diminished responsibility. It is an explanation which also has its respectable model in the ‘high’ theory of semiology, which as Deborah Cameron points out ‘sees experience and indeed the individual herself, as a product and function of an institutionalised system of signs’, where language ‘defines our possi­bilities and limitations, [and] constitutes our subjectivities’.’ As an explanation of limitations and their causes, it is closer to excusing incapability and inadequacy than to positing them as a problem to be overcome. As feminists or Walker’s womanists, however, we will start from the assumption of women’s traditional competence and ability and attribute responsibility to ourselves. For our aim is less to describe these symptoms in the interest of a precise diagnosis and aetiology of our speech impediments, than to analyse the power of discourse and the abuse of this power, in the interest of overcoming them. Nothing prevents us from questioning language use, least of all our own, from asking who we are speaking to when we say ‘we’, who is meant and who is not, and whether what we say applies to this group; when we say ‘women’, from asking ‘all women, or which women?’, and when we describe facts, whether they are as we say, and if we are in a position to judge them. Nothing stops us asking about the acting subjects which have disappeared from passive and adjectival construc­tions representing actions, or from statements concerning perceptions, by whom ‘excluded’, by whom ‘oppressed’, to whom ‘invisible’, and so forth. That is, nothing stops us from attempting to render concrete again what has linguistically been abstracted. For here we can take a first step towards changing political reality, analysing the contexts of action and naming the agents. Only when we recognize the connec­tions and know those responsible for action can we begin to intervene in political reality and to know where to put up resistance. All the more so if the actions concerned are our own which we have thus tried to withdraw from (our) view. If we nevertheless fail to do so, if we continue to treat communic­ative and discursive behaviour as if they were a natural and individual attribute of ourselves like, say, the colour of our hair, it must be political intention. If we are unwilling to question our use of language and to analyse the power relations in our linguistic behaviour, it betrays our willingness to use the relative power of educational and academic privilege and to abuse it in our own interest. To the extent that our language conforms to the structures of dominant discourse —in particular, its abstraction which conceals the substantial connections and relations of reality — it betrays an intention conforming to the meaning and function of that discourse: to legitimate and maintain power and the distribution of power in society.

### Impacts

**4. Colonialism – Postmodernist critiques reproduce colonial knowledge – their politics locates theory in the North and subjects to be studied in the South – this is epistemic colonialism**

**Grosfoguel 11** (Ramon Grosfoguel – PhD in sociology and associate professor in Ethnics studies and Chicano/Latino studies at UC Berkeley, 2011, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity,¶ Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf) //MD

In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University ¶ between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern ¶ Studies Group. The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the ¶ publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was ¶ the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. ¶ Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I ¶ would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group ¶ were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic ¶ schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced ¶ studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern ¶ perspective. Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located ¶ in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial ¶ epistemology was crucial to my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the ¶ United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge ¶ produced by this Latinamericanist group. They underestimated in their work ¶ ethnic/racial perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege ¶ predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave ¶ epistemic privilege to what they called the “four horses of the apocalypse” (Mallon ¶ 1994; Rodríguez 2001), that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the ¶ four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them ¶ (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. ¶ Only one, Rinajit Guha, is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western ¶ thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce ¶ subaltern studies.

¶ Among the many reasons for the split of the Latin American Subaltern Studies ¶ Group, one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern ¶ critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who ¶ read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism ¶ from subalternized and silenced knowledges) [Mignolo 2000: 183-186; 213-214]. ¶ For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group made evident the need to epistemologically ¶ transcend, that is, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. The South ¶ Asian Subaltern Studies Group’s main project is a critique to Western European ¶ colonial historiography about India and to Indian nationalist Eurocentric ¶ historiography of India. But by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci ¶ and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to Eurocentrism. ¶ Although they represent different epistemic projects, the South Asian Subaltern ¶ School privilege of Western epistemic canon overlapped with the sector of the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group that sided with postmodernism. However, with all ¶ its limits, South Asian Subaltern Studies Group represents an important contribution ¶ to the critique of Eurocentrism. It forms part of an intellectual movement known as ¶ postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of ¶ modernity from the Global North) [Mignolo 2000]. These debates made clear to us ¶ (those who took side with the decolonial critique described above), the need to ¶ decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies (Grosfoguel ¶ 2006a; 2006b).

¶ This is not an essentialist, fundamentalist, anti-European critique. It is a ¶ perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, ¶ colonialism and nationalism. Border thinking, one of the epistemic perspectives to be ¶ discussed in this article, is precisely a critical response to both hegemonic and ¶ marginal fundamentalisms. What all fundamentalisms share (including the ¶ Eurocentric one) is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from ¶ which to achieve Truth and Universality. However, my main points here are three: 1) ¶ that a decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought than ¶ simply the Western canon (including the Left Western canon); 2) that a truly ¶ universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal (one ¶ particular that raises itself as universal global design), but would have to be the ¶ result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/political ¶ projects towards a pluriversal as oppose to a universal world; 3) that decolonization ¶ of knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic ¶ perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking ¶ from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. Postmodernism ¶ and postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught within the Western canon ¶ reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form of coloniality ¶ of power/knowledge.